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jury, take his chances upon the verdict, and, if against him,
then by assignment of error or motion in arrest take advantage
12 4
of it."
Appeal from Municipal Court Judgments
The Louisiana Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over
municipal court judgments is specifically limited to those cases
where a fine exceeding $300, or imprisonment exceeding six
months is actually imposed, or where the constitutionality or
legality of the penalty is attacked. 125 In State v. LaBorde126 the
defendant, convicted of petty theft, had been sentenced to pay a
fine of $200 and to serve one year in jail with nine months of the
jail sentence being suspended upon the payment of the fine. In
assuming appellate jurisdiction to review the sentence the supreme court held that a sentence of one year had actually been
imposed. The suspension of nine months of that sentence upon
payment of the fine would result in a conditional release of the
defendant from imprisonment. If, however, the offender was convicted of another crime during the period of such suspension he
would be subject to arrest and must serve the full time of his
sentence in jail. 127 Justice McCaleb's majority opinion is consistent with the real nature and purpose of the suspended sentence. A sentence of imprisonment was actually imposed, but
suspended on condition that the offender should abstain from
further violations of the criminal law. The LaBorde case is different from the situation where imprisonment is imposed in
default of the payment of a fine. In that instance payment of the
fine completely relieves the offender from imprisonment and it
has been consistently held that the imprisonment sentence is not,
therefore, actually imposed within the meaning of the consti28
tution.1
VII. LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
Albert H. Cotton*
ORGANIZATION AND BOUNDARIES

Perhaps the most important case decided by the Louisiana
Supreme Court during the year in the field of local government
124. 214 La. 831, 853, 39 So.(2d) 76, 83, quoting from State v. Stracner, 190

La. 457, 182 So. 571, 576.
125. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 10.
126. 214 La. 644, 38 So.(2d) 371 (1948).
127. Art. 536, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.

128. State v. Desimone, 143 La. 505, 78 So. 751 (1918); State v. Roy, 152 La.
933, 94 So. 703 (1922).
*Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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law was State ex rel. Kemp, Attorney General v. City of Baton
Rouge,' where the validity of the new city-parish form of government was upheld. The first objection raised against the Baton
Rouge plan was to the validity of the constitutional amendment
authorizing it, Article XIV, Section 3a. It was contended that
the amendment contained more than one subject, which is prohibited by Article XXI, Section 1, of the Louisiana Constitution.2
The court rejected this contention on the grounds that all of the
six allegedly different subjects were germane to the one main
purpose, to establish a plan of government. This view would
appear to be so obvious as to make the question scarcely worth
litigating, if it were not for the decision in Graham v. Jones3
which held that a plan for the reorganization of the state government, submitted as one amendment by Act 384 of 1940, violated
Article XXI, Section 1. The court did not apply the doctrine
of Graham v. Jones to the facts of the present case. As a result
it appears that Graham v. Jones will not be used to thwart plans
of governmental reorganization. The court will follow the rule
that it is sufficient if all the provisions of a constitutional amendment are germane to one purpose or design. Progress in the field
of governmental reorganization is difficult enough at best, and
it could become impossible if the courts were to enforce onesubject rules with regard to constitutional amendments with the
same strictness that some courts, sometimes, have enforced
them against statutes. Certainly a mechanical invalidation of
any amendment which affected more than one article or section
of the constitution would make any comprehensive plan of government reorganization impossible.
Having disposed of this major obstacle, it followed easily
enough that the changes specifically authorized by the amendment were valid against objections that they. conflicted with
prior constitutional provisions.
The decision is of most interest for its discussion of the
1. 215 La. 315, 40 So.(2d) 477 (1949).
2. The provision is not in form a one-subject provision. What the con-

stitution says is:

"When more than one amendment shall be submitted at

the same election, they shall be so submitted as to enable the electors to
vote on each amendment separately." The court, however, has treated this
as a one-subject provision, though not as so restrictive a one as applied to
legislation by Louisiana Constitution Article III, Section 16, which reads,
"Every law enacted by the legislature shall embrace but one object, and
shall have a title indicative of such object." See discussion in principal case
at 40 So.(2d) 477, 480, 481.
3. 198 La. 507, 3 So.(2d) 761 (1941), criticized in The Work of the Louisi-

ana Supreme Court for the 1940-1941 Term (1942) 4 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw215-219.
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power of the state over municipal corporations, in the establishment and discontinuance of units, transfer of property between
them, and establishment of their boundaries. The court adopts
the view of the United States Supreme Court, that the Fourteenth Amendment imposed no restrictions on the states in this
field, 4 and further finds no additional restrictions in the Louisiana
Constitution. This view, of course, disposed of all objections
to the consolidation of functions whether urged from the point
of view of the inhabitants or of the consolidated units as proprietors.
One novel feature of the Baton Rouge plan is the establishment of industrial districts, which do not fit into the conventional
division of all land between urban and rural. The industrial
districts are defined as districts where the industries themselves
furnish substantial services normally provided by local governments.8 It was provided that the parish tax limitations, rather
than the municipal, should apply in the industrial areas. This
three-way division of territory - urban-industrial-rural - while
novel, appears to be more in accord with the realities of modern
society and community planning than the traditional division and
to open definite possibilities for future development.
The plan of government adopted went further than the constitutional provision and prohibited the construction of residential buildings in the industrial areas. This is an advance on conventional zoning technique, even within urban areas, where it
is customary to permit residences everywhere, and to attempt
only to keep industries and businesses out of residential areas.
The court did not directly pass upon this feature of the plan.
It was held to be severable, and hence its validity need not be
decided where the constitutional attack was directed against the
4. The court quoted extensively from Laramie County v. Albany County,
92 U.S. 307, 23 L.Ed. 552 (1876) and cited among others the leading cases

of Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 28 S.Ct. 40, 52 L.Ed. 151 (1907) and City
of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 43 S.Ct. 534, 67 LEd. 937, 29 A.L.R.
1471 (1923). It found, however, that no such injustice was actually wrought

In this case as those approved in some of the United States Supreme Court
cases.

5. The court cited with approval the case of City of New Orleans v.
Cazelar, 27 La. Ann. 156 (1875), upholding an extension of the New Orleans

city limits, which included a little plot of marsh land which received no
police or fire protection or any of the other benefits of municipal government. In view of Myles Salt Co. v. Board of Comm'rs of Iberia & St. Mary's
Drainage Dist., 239 U.S. 478, 36 S.Ct. 204, 60 L.Ed. 392 (1916), reversing 134

La. 903, 64 So. 825 (1914), it may be doubted if the United State Supreme
Court would go so far, but the Myles Salt case might be limited to improve-

ment districts and not applied to cities.
6. La. Const. of 1921, Art. XIV, § 3a.
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plan as a whole. The court referred, however, to the power to
zone conferred on municipalities by Louisiana Constitution,
Article XIV, Section 29; and it appears to be a safe prediction
that in a proper case the provisions relating to industrial districts
would be upheld.
The extension of the city limits of Baton Rouge, authorized
in the amendment and included in the plan of government, was
the subject of a separate constitutional attack, although the
arguments in support of the reorganization and consolidation
provisions were conclusive on this question. The objection that
the general state law on extending municipal limits 7 had not
been followed was held to be without force, since the extension
was authorized by the constitutional amendment. The court regarded the extension in the same light as one made by the legislature itself, and denied that it was invalid, under the Fourteenth
Amendment, because no right was given to the people in the
territory to be annexed to vote separately. This is in accord with
the view the United States Supreme Court has taken on this
question.8
Finally, objections to the levy of the full parochial tax rate
within the City of Baton Rouge were rejected, since it was held
that the maintenance of the streets had been validly transferred
to the parish by the plan of government, and hence Article XIV,
Section 8, of the Louisiana Constitution had no application.
The decision has importance beyond the City of Baton Rouge.
The problems of the proper organization of local government
and the elimination and coordination of overlapping units have
attracted increasing attention in recent years. There has been
an increased demand for municipal services all over the country,
and at the same time the burden of taxes of all kinds has become more oppressive. One widely discussed solution is citycounty consolidation. Students of city planning and local government will be encouraged to learn that the constitutional amendment authorizing the Baton Rouge experiment has met the approval of the Louisiana Supreme Court.
Pyle v. City of Shreveport9 represents an unsuccessful attempt of a city to meet the problem of suburbs under the general
state law, without benefit of a comprehensive plan of reorganization or a constitutional amendment. The City Council of
7. La. Act 315 of 1946 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1949) § 5373.1].
8. Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 28 S.Ct. 40, 52 L.Ed. 151 (1907),
9. 215 La. 257, 40 So.(2d) 235 (1949).
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Shreveport, acting under Act 315 of 1946,10 after receiving two
petitions for annexations of two different areas, annexed both
under one ordinance. The court held that this could not be done
under the terms of the statute.
On rehearing, the court considered the reasonableness of the
annexations proposed. Objections to the proposed boundaries,
found to make them unreasonable, were (1) the boundaries were
irregularly drawn, in a manner not justified by natural or other
barriers, apparently because certain property owners desired
to be excluded and (2) the country club was excluded.
The difference in the attitude of the court toward the boundary extension in the Shreveport case and the Baton Rouge case
is striking. However, it was invited by the legislature. In the
general statute the court is directed to consider the "reasonableness" of the annexation.
The vesting of final discretion in the judiciary represents
probably the best solution to the problem of the enlargement
of cities. It has obvious advantages over an election procedure,
especially if the territory to be annexed is permitted to vote separately. Despite the failure of this particular annexation, the
basic scheme of Act 315 of 1946 appears to be sound. Generally,
however, cities expand in several directions, and it may often
represent better municipal planning to annex several suburbs at
once. The court objected to the procedure used by the Shreveport
council solely because it was not authorized by the act, but the
legislature could easily adopt an amendment providing for annexation of two or more parcels by one ordinance.
As to the objections on grounds of reasonableness, it would
be well for cities in future annexation ordinances to follow fairly
straight boundaries unless natural barriers justify irregularity,
and, in view of the majority opinion, to be prepared to justify
the specific boundaries, as well as the annexation generally.
Those who really trust local administrative discretion will prefer
the approach to the problem in Justice Hamiter's dissenting opinion, but it is clear that the majority of the court will determine
the question of reasonableness with but little, if any, presumption in favor of the local administrative action. As for the country club, it is better to annex it. Courts everywhere, if permitted
to review city annexations with free judicial discretion, prefer
to see the country club taken in."
10. Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1949) § 5373.1-5373.9.
11. See, for example, Henrico County v. City of Richmond, 177 Va. 754,

15 S.E. (2d) 309 (1941).
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In Carrerev. Orleans Club, 12 the New Orleans Women's Club,
a non-conforming user, had secured a building permit to erect
an auditorium as an addition to its club building. Plaintiffs,
neighboring landowners, secured an injunction in the lower court
forbidding the construction on the theory that the following
provision of the New Orleans zoning ordinance had not been
complied with:
in the "C" and "D" Apartment Districts no building or
premises shall be used and no building shall be hereafter
erected or structurally altered, unless otherwise provided in
this ordinance except for one or more of the following
uses: ....
" '4. Private Clubs and Lodges, excepting those the
chief activity of which is a service customarily carried on as
a business, provided, however, that the Commission Council
may in its discretion, permit private clubs and lodges, excepting those the chief activity of which is a service customarily carried on as a business, within the "C" and "D"
apartment districts, upon the application of not less than
seventy (70%) percent of the property owners within 300
feet of any or all portions of the premises to be so used.' "13
" '...

The court construed the second "excepting" as meaning "including" in order to avoid conflict with the first provision, which
it regarded as an unqualified exemption from the requirements
of the section of private clubs whose chief activities were not
services customarily carried on as a business. This construction,
which made it unnecessary to pass upon the constitutional question of the validity of the consent provision, was not placed
upon this ground, but upon the grounds that (1) the lawmakers
had not intended a contradictory provision and (2) zoning ordinances must be strictly construed in favor of the property owner
and (3) that it was in accord with the construction of the municipal authorities and the city attorney. Consequently, the
decision below was reversed and the suit dismissed.
To determine whether the club was carrying on activities
customarily carried on as a business the court examined its
activities in some detail. Except in that the activities appear
typical of women's clubs, this aspect of the case is of little gen12. 214 La. 303, 37 So.(2d) 715 (1948).
13. 214 La. 303, 306, 37 So.(2d) 715, 716.
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eral interest. It is noteworthy, however, that the court regarded
it as significant that the club was recognized as exempt from
income and capital stock tax under Section 101 (7) of the Inter14
nal Revenue Code.
MUNICIPAL PROPERTY

The decision in City of New Orleans v. Dupuy Storage &
ForwardingCorporation," that the Public Belt Railroad Commission has implied power to sell property not needed for the operation of its railroad, is remarkable, not because the court reached
an obvious common sense result, but because it illustrates the
6
atmosphere in which the law of municipal corporations operates.
Here the defendant-purchaser was in fact anxious to buy
the land, and suit was brought because title attorneys questioned
the authority of the Public Belt Railroad Commission to convey.
The doubts were based on three grounds: (1) the lack of any
specific authority to convey surplus property generally; (2) the
presence of provisions designed to prevent the sale of the whole
railroad system which might be construed as also prohibiting
the sale of parts, including unused parts;' 7 (3) the existence of
provisions specifically authorizing sale of surplus property in the
case of the Mississippi River Bridge.' 8
The court had no difficulty in finding an implied power of
sale, for unused property, especially in view of its decision in
Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans v. New Orleans Public Service, Incorporated.'9 where a similar implied
power to sell surplus property had been found to exist in the
New Orleans Port Commission. Despite this decision, however,
title attorneys would be well advised to continue to insist on
court action to clear title in all cases where the vendor is a pub14. 26 U.S.C.A. § 109(9).
15. 215 La. 795, 41 So.(2d) 721 (1949).
16. The classic statement of the denial of power of officers of public
corporations to act sensibly is 1 Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5 ed. 1911)
§ 237: "It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal
corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers, and no others:
First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly
implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those essential
to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the corpora-

tion,-not simply convenient, but indispensable. Any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved by the courts
against the corporation, and the power is denied. . . . These principles are
of transcendent importance, and lie at the foundation of the law of municipal corporations."

17. La. Const. of 1921, Art. XIV, § 26.
18. Id. at § 28.
19. 161 La. 741, 109 So. 408 (1926).
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lic body, and the statutory authority for the sale is unclear. This
case indicates that the Louisiana court will not hamper public
bodies by requiring them to retain permanent investments in
unused properties. So long, however, as it remains general doctrine that the powers of municipal corporations and public bodies
must be strictly construed and must be specifically conferred, it
would be advisable for counsel to insist upon a decision with
regard to the particular public body and statute involved. Legislative draftsmen can help by recognizing the problem of the disposal of surplus property in creating such agencies.
An incidental point of interest is that, under the implied
power, the court upheld a privately negotiated contract, adopted
by the commission by resolution. The absence of a statutory procedure for sale was held no bar to the making of the sale by
normal business methods.
TAXPAYERS' ACTIONS

The case of Tucker v. Edwards20 was a sequel to Gravity
Drainage District No. 2 v. Edwards.21 The Gravity Drainage District suit was an action to recover on a depository bond for money
the district had lost in 1932 in a closed bank. In the trial court,
a majority of the members of the board joined in a motion to
dismiss the action, which was granted. The attorney for the
board in the trial court took an appeal, dismissed in the supreme
court, on motion of the district attorney, acting under a resolution adopted by the successor board to the board which originally instituted the suit.
The present action was started thereafter, on a tort theory,
by plaintiffs as taxpayers, on behalf of the district, alleging that
between the defendants, board members, obligees on the bond,
and the district attorney who moved to dismiss the appeal there
was a conspiracy to give away an asset of the district, that is,
the right to recover on the depository bond. The suit was dismissed on the ground that failure to perform discretionary acts
does not subject public officers to personal liability, and the
judgment of dismissal was affirmed.
Technically, there seems no grounds for objection to any
of the decisions in this dispute. As much cannot be said for
20. 214 La. 560, 38 So.(2d) 241 (1948).
21. 207 La. 1, 20 So.(2d) 405 (1944), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1944-1945 Term (1946) 6 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
625.
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the actual result. Here the drainage district deposited money
in a bank, relying on an apparently valid depository bond given
by a solvent party. Yet after seventeen years of litigation
there has been no authoritative decision as to the actual validity
of the bond, and the district has not recovered any money,
except such sums as might have been paid in liquidation without regard to the depository bond. The nearest the matter came
to consideration was in the trial of the first case, and there
the majority of the board joined in the motion to dismiss, not
on the grounds that the bond was invalid, but on the grounds
that the deposit had been made and the bond given to aid the
local bank from motives of the community's best interests
rather than personal gain.2 2 The statutes presently provide
for audit of the accounts of drainage districts by the supervisor of public accounts, 23 and it appears that the first suit here
was brought at the instance of that official 24 under threat of
indicttnent of the members of the board. A more effective remedy would be to permit the state official to bring suit on behalf
of the district.
There is, however, a more fundamental problem. To what
extent, if any, in times of depression, are public officials justified in depositing public funds to bolster up shaky banks, on
the theory that the whole community would be benefited if the
bank can be saved? Should they start a home-town R.F.C.?
There appears to be no legal justification for such a use of public
funds. Yet here, and in many cases in the early 1930's such action was taken. The problem should be faced squarely, and liability or non-liability not left to be determined finally seventeen
years later, upon the basis of the procedure attempted to be used
to enforce the liability, or the attitude of the successor local
boards in the particular case.
RIGHT TO PUBLIC OFFICE

Various aspects of the problem of the right to public office
were before the court in five cases during the year. Perhaps the
most important of these cases, from the point of view of the legal
principles determined, was State ex rel. Thompson v. Department of City Civil Service. 25 Here the relator, a judge of the
22.
23.
24.
25.

207 La. 1, 5, 20 So.(2d) 405, 406 (1944).
Dart's Stats. (1939) § 7368.
207 La. 1, 5, 20 So. (2d) 405, 406.
214 La. 683, 38 So.(2d) 385 (1948).
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Recorders Court of the City of New Orleans, contended that he
was protected against dismissal by the City Civil Service Act.2 6
The court held that it was not the legislative intent to include
judicial officers in the civil service act, relying on an analysis of
the act showing that many provisions were obviously inapplicable to judicial officers, and the general rule that civil service
acts do not cover the judiciary, even though broad language referring to all officers and employees is used. The decision is
based upon the legislative intent in the act involved, and would
not preclude the legislature from devising a civil service system
for judicial officers, if it desired to do so, and conformed to constitutional provisions relating to the judiciary.
Blessing v. Levy 27 involved an attempt by the judge of the
New Orleans Juvenile Court to remain in office, contending that
the adoption of Section 96 of Article VII of the Constitution,
voted on the same day as the election of her successor, had the
effect of extending her term of office for an additional eight
years and voiding the election of her successor. The court rejected this contention, in reliance on the rule that a construction
which would have unseemly and absurd consequences should be
avoided. On this issue the decision of the court was unanimous.
As an alternative ground, Judge Levy contended that Judge
Blessing had not practiced law for five years as required by the
constitutional amendment and that she was entitled to hold
office until a qualified successor was chosen. The court rejected
this contention, holding that the only issue under the statute"5
was title to the office, and not eligibility, applying the same
rule as obtains in intrusion to office suits under Act 102 of 1928.29
Justice Fournet dissented from this portion of the opinion.
The rule that statutes would not be construed so as to give
them absurd and ridiculous meanings was again employed in
Berteau v. Police Jury of Parish of Ascension 30 to uphold the
action of the police jury in constituting itself the Board of Commissioners of the East Ascension Consolidated Gravity Drainage
District No. 1, as specifically authorized in Act 91 of 1948. Plaintiff unsuccessfully contended that another provision of the act,
requiring the police jurors to appoint the commissioners "in ac26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

La. Act 171 of 1940 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1949) § 6281.
214 La. 856, 39 So.(2d) 84 (1949).
Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 2849-2852.
Dart's Stats. (1939) § 7712 et seq.
214 La. 1003, 39 So.(2d) 594 (1949).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

(VOL.

X

cordance with law" required them to appoint five resident prop1
erty owners as required by Act 212 of 1942.3
Avant v. Ouachita Parish School Board3 2 required a determination of whether the words "of a city" in Section 17 of Act
100 of 192233 should be construed as meaning "belonging to a
city" or as meaning "within a city." The court adopted the construction of "within a city," relying primarily on the legislative
intention and the unfairness of the opposite result, which would
be to deny residents of a city representation on a parish school
board operating schools within the city. The significance of the
decision, however, appears limited by its particular facts and
the peculiar dual school systems operated in the City of Monroe.
BOND IssuE--ATTORNEY's FEES
The case of First Sewerage District of the City of Lake
Charles v. City Council of Lake Charles8 4 was an injunction proceeding brought by the sewerage district to prevent the city
council from paying a special fee to the city attorney for services in connection with a bond issue sold for the sewerage district by the city. The city proposed to deduct the fee, as an expense, from the proceeds of the bond issue, before turning them
over to the sewerage district. The court held that the city had
implied power to pay such a fee, where the statutory provisions
for the employment of a special attorney 35 were complied with,
and that the fee could be paid to the city attorney in view of the
amendment striking out the provision providing that the city
attorney should serve as attorney for sewerage districts ex
officio, without compensation.8 0 The decision follows logically
from the statutes, and the implication of the power to employ
counsel in a matter as complex as a municipal bond issue is clear
enough. It should be noted, however, that the case passes only
on the right of the city to employ and pay counsel. The right
of the sewerage district to have employed and paid its own
counsel was not passed on, since this in fact had not been done.
3.1.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1949) § 7032.
215 La. 990, 41 So.(2d) 854 (1949).
Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2236.
215 La. 428, 40 So.(2d) 808 (1949).
Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1949) § 7409.

36. La. Act 46 of 1928, § 7.

